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Abstract
This study exploits a natural experiment in Belgium to estimate the e¤ect of co-
payment increases on the demand for physician services. It shows how a di¤erences-
in-di¤erences estimator of the price e¤ects can be decomposed into e¤ects induced by
the common average proportional price increase (income e¤ects) and by the change in
relative prices (substitution e¤ects). The price elasticity of a uniform proportional
price increase is relatively small (-.13 for men and -.03 for women). Substitution
e¤ects are large, especially for women, but imprecisely estimated. Despite the sub-
stantial price increases, the e¢ciency gain of the reform, if any, is modest.
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11 Introduction
On the 1st January, 1994 the health authorities in Belgium increased the co-payment
rates of three types of physician services in Belgium: o¢ce visits to general practitioners
(GPs), GP home visits and specialist visits. In this study we analyse the impact of
this measure on the demand for these outpatient health care services. We decompose
this impact into the e¤ect of a common average proportional price increase (an income
e¤ect) and into the e¤ects induced by changing relative prices (substitution e¤ects). On
the basis of these measured impact e¤ects, we calculate the (gross) social bene…t of this
policy and its determinants.
In the literature, numerous studies have estimated the price elasticity of the demand
for health services.1 However, unsatisfactory treatment of methodological problems re-
sults often in unreliable estimates (see Newhouse et al. (1980) for a review of these
problems). In order to cope with these di¢culties the federal authorities of United
States initiated a social experiment in the seventies: the Rand experiment (Manning et
al., 1987, Newhouse et al., 1993). The results of the experiment con…rm that an increase
in the individual’s cost sharing (from 0% to 95% for instance) implies a reduction in
the average health care expenditures (of 46% in the example), in the probability of any
medical use (27:5%) and in the unconditional probability of inpatient use (33;8%). The
corresponding price elasticity of the demand for health care services is not very large,
ranging from ¡0:2 to ¡0:1, but signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The price elasticity of
the demand for ambulatory care is higher, ranging from ¡0:17 for co-payments between
0% and 25% to ¡:31 for higher co-payment rates.
More recently, some studies have attempted to estimate the price sensitivity of the
demand for medical services in Europe. Nolan (1993) studies the Irish health care system.
Using data from a national household survey carried out throughout Ireland in 1987, the
author estimates that the individuals bene…ting from free access to primary health care
services are more likely to consume outpatient and inpatient services and, conditional on
positive consumption, report a signi…cantly higher number of medical visits. This study
faces, however, an endogeneity problem common to cross section studies. Rather than
being a consequence of a change in behaviour induced by a higher coverage (a lower
co-payment rate), the increased consumption could result from a positive correlation
between coverage and a higher (unobserved) propensity to consume, such as predicted
in an insurance market with adverse selection (Chiappori et al. 1998, Newhouse et al.,
1980).
Chiappori et al. (1998) exploit a natural experiment2 to estimate the e¤ect of cost
sharing on the demand for physician services in France. In France employees can buy
additional insurance on the private market in order to bring the cost sharing rate down
to 0%. However, on the …rst of July 1993, a point in time when the government’s health
insurance became less generous, some, but not all, private insurance companies decided
1See Zweifel and Manning (2000) for a recent survey.
2See Meyer (1995), Besley and Case (2000) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) for a general discussion
of the validity of the inferences drawn on natural experiments.
2to increase the co-payment rate from 0% to 10%. The study estimates the e¤ect of cost
sharing on the demand by comparing a group of employees for whom the co-payment
increased to a group for whom it did not3. On the basis of a panel probit model,
contrasting the control and treatment groups, the study …nds that the participation rate
in GP home visits is signi…cantly a¤ected by the co-payment level. No signi…cant e¤ect,
however, is found for GP o¢ce visits.
Our study relies on a similar natural experiment. On the 1st of January 1994, the
co-payment rates for physician services of the mandatory public health insurance scheme
in Belgium increased substantially for all but one category of individuals: in real terms,
the rate increased by 48% for GP o¢ce visits, by 35% for GP home visits and by 60%
for specialist visits. As in the French study, we can therefore contrast the impact of the
change on the treatment group to a control group4. Since, for reasons of con…dentiality,
we have only access to grouped data, a simple linear di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DD)
estimator implements such a contrast.
In independent work Van de Voorde et al. (2001) apply such DD estimators on similar
grouped data for Belgium.5 We argue, however, that the price elasticities deduced from
this study are incorrect, since they implicitly ignore the substitution e¤ects induced by
the relative price variations of these physician services.6 In this paper we explicitly allow
for substitution e¤ects within the group of three physician services considered. To this
purpose we estimate a system of demand equations as derived from the classic theory of
consumer demand and the principles of two-stage budgeting (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980a, Barten and Bohm, 1982).
A second objective of this paper is to evaluate the (gross) e¢ciency gain of this
policy reform. The e¢cient co-payment rate in health insurance trades-o¤ the e¢ciency
gains from risk sharing and the e¢ciency costs induced by moral hazard (see Arrow,
1963; Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970). In the US substantial research e¤orts have been
undertaken to determine this e¢cient rate. Until recently, this research concluded that
the cost of moral hazard is large relative to bene…ts and that higher co-payment rates
were warranted (Feldstein 1973; Feldstein and Friedman, 1977; Feldman and Dowd,
1991; Manning and Marquis, 1996). However, the analysis in this research was based on
a partial equilibrium framework. Such a framework ignores that (uncompensated) price
e¤ects decompose in income and substitution e¤ects and that only the latter a¤ect the
e¢ciency of an insurance scheme. In a recent paper, Nyman (1999) argues that income
e¤ects are important and their neglect in previous studies have led to prescribe cost
3Besley and Case, (2000, p. 674) question whether these groups are comparable: the private companies
that increased the copayment rate might have done so, because they needed worry more about over-
consumption. If so, the e¤ect on demand is under-estimated.
4Note that there is no complementary private insurance for ambulatory physician services in Belgium.
We may therefore be con…dent that the reduction of coverage is not undone by increased coverage of
private insurance companies.
5In earlier work for Belgium, Van Doorslaer (1984) estimated the price elasticity of the demand for
prescription drugs and Carrin and Van Daal (1991) for dental care. More recently, Adriaensen and
De Graeve (2000) studied the demand for GP and specialist services. However, this study is based on
cross-section data and does not control for the selection bias induced by unobservables.
6There are additional reasons why our …ndings deviate from theirs (see Section 4.4 below).
3sharing rates in the US at too high levels.7 In addition, in a theoretical contribution,
Besley (1988)8 demonstrates that not only the own compensated price e¤ect, but also
cross-price e¤ects matter in the design of the optimal cost sharing rule. These are
generally not allowed for in the empirical literature.9 Nevertheless, one type of interaction
e¤ect among di¤erent health services has retained interest. It has been argued that,
by reducing coverage of outpatient services, preventive care might be deterred thereby
inducing more expenditure on inpatient (curative) services. However, Manning et al.’s
(1987, p.271) report that the …ndings of the Rand experiment suggest, if anything, that
outpatient and inpatient services are complements, not substitutes.
In this study we do not estimate the net, but the gross e¢ciency gain of the price
reform. For, data limitations do not allow evaluating the cost of increased risk induced
by the lower insurance coverage. Moreover, for the same reason, even if we decompose
the price e¤ect into income and substitution e¤ects within the group of the three higher
mentioned physician services, we can account neither for the income e¤ect of the in-
creased co-payments on total expenditures nor for substitution e¤ects between the three
physician services and other (health) goods and services. We can therefore only calculate
an upper bound for the gross e¢ciency gain.
The paper is organised as follows. The following section describes the Belgian health
care system. In Section 3, we describe the data. In Section 4 we present the standard
DD estimator and propose an alternative one that can be decomposed in income and
substitution e¤ects. In Section 5 we formulate the Rotterdam demand system (Barten,
1966 and Theil, 1965) assuming two-stage budgeting. We show how the alternative
DD can be decomposed. On the basis of the estimation results, we calculate the gross
proportional e¢ciency gain of the increase in the co-payment rates and decompose this
gain into its determinants. A …nal section concludes.
2 The Belgian Health Care System10
In Belgium, almost all individuals are covered by a (semi-)public insurance system. All
workers with a professional activity must contribute to the scheme. Premiums are set
proportionally to earnings. Competition is introduced in that individuals are o¤ered a
7See Blomqvist (2001) for a critical discussion of this view.
8Besley (1988) argues that the cost of a health insurance scheme induced by moral hazard should not
only be traded-o¤ against the e¢ciency gains in terms of risk sharing, but also against the enhanced
e¢ciency of a redistributive policy in a second best world in which optimal lump-sum taxes and transfers
do not exist.
9Davis and Russell (1972) and Newhouse and Phelps (1976) are notable exceptions of studies that take
account of the interdependencies between the demands for di¤erent physician services. They study the
interrelationship between the demand for hospital days and the demand for physician services. Newhouse
et al. (1980) argue, however, that the insurance variable in the …rst study is misspeci…ed and that their
results are therefore suspect.
10In this section, we only give some information that we consider necessary for the understanding of
our analysis. For a larger description of the Belgian health care system, we refer our readers to Hurst
(1992) and Crainich and Closon (1998).
4choice between a number of non-pro…t sickness funds11 administrating the reimbursement
of health expenditures and o¤ering a number of additional services entailing product
di¤erentiation. In return for the premium, patients are partially or totally reimbursed
for the cost of their health care expenditures. Patients can buy additional insurance on
the private market to cover the share of health expenditures not covered by the public
system. However, this relates only to hospital services and to some speci…c services, such
as the transportation of patients. Additional insurance cannot be bought for physician
services on which we focus in this paper.
In Belgium, the choice of physician, GP or specialist, is free. Specialists can be con-
sulted directly without GP referral. Both the fee due for health care services and the
patient’s co-payment are …xed jointly in negotiations involving the government, repre-
sentatives of the sickness funds and of the physicians. The latter are not obliged to apply
the fee agreed upon in negotiations, but the large majority of physicians do apply it. In
practice, this implies that the price change recorded in January 1994 can be expected to
have a¤ected most of the patients.
The co-payment rates …xed in the agreements between the above-mentioned parties
di¤er across patients depending on their ’social category’. The …rst social category con-
sists of individuals that by their (past12) professional activity have contributed to the
Social Insurance system. This group of individuals and their dependants (ascendants,
descendants or spouse), the so-called ’titulaires indemnisables’ (tip), bene…t from the
standard conditions o¤ered by the public health insurance. In 1995 The second social
category consists of the widowed, disabled, retired or orphaned individuals (vipo) with-
out any (past) professional activity This group is exempted from contributions. It is
further divided up according to the income level of the household. The ’vipos’ with
an income below a certain threshold acquire a preferential status and are called ’vipos
préférentiels’ (vipo pref ). This group bene…ts from a reduced co-payment rate for health
expenditures. The other group, the ’vipos non préférentiels’ (vipo nopr), are imposed
the same conditions as the tip.
These social categories are further classi…ed into three schemes: the ’general scheme’,
the ’self-employed’ and the ’special schemes’. The …rst scheme groups most bene…ciaries
from the public health insurance system whereas the ’special schemes’ only concern
individuals in speci…c professions, such as miners and sailors from the merchant navy.
As to the ’self-employed’, the compulsory social insurance only covers ’large risks’, such
as hospital services. These workers can voluntarily decide whether they buy insurance
against ’small risks’.
11The insurance market is dominated in Belgium by …ve sickness funds, with the Christian and Socialist
sickness funds grouping in 1995, respectively, 45% and 27% of the a¢liated (Janssens, 1998, p. 39). The
sickness funds are decentralised into ’federations’ that group local entities.
12For unemployed workers entitled to Unemployment Insurance bene…ts.
53 The Data
The analysis relies on administrative data originating from a Belgian sickness fund (the
’Mutualités Chrétiennes’). They contain only data on individuals entitled to health
insurance within the ’general scheme’. For reasons of con…dentiality, the sickness fund did
not authorise access to individual data. We thus acquired grouped data on the average13
number of physician visits of each type for the years 1993 and 1994 for two federations
of the sickness fund, ’Liège’ and ’Gent’14. For each year and for each federation the
entitled individuals are grouped according to each combination of the following personal
characteristics: the sex, the age (age < 30, 30 · age < 50 and age ¸ 50), the type
of household (with or without dependants), the social category (tip, vipo nopr and vipo
pref ) and the gross annual professional earnings (E) expressed in euro (E = 0, 0 < E ·
12;500, 12;500 < E · 25;000, E > 25:000). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of
these data.
Table 1 also contains …gures on the average number of visits to or by the physician
for two sub-samples: the ’treated group/treated’ and the ’control group/controls’. The
former group comprises the social categories tip and vipo nopr. It is this group that
has been imposed substantial increases in the co-payment rates for physician visits on
the 1st of January 1994:15 in real terms this amounted to +48% for GP o¢ce visits,
+35% for GP home visits and +60% for specialist visits (see Table 2). The latter group
consists in the social category vipo pref. We refer to it as the ’control group’, since the
co-payment rates for physician visits of this group were not modi…ed during the 1993-94
period. Observe, however, that even if the rates did not change, this group had to a pay
slightly di¤erent price for these physician services in 1994: slightly more in real terms
for GP o¢ce visits, but slightly less for the other two physician services. This is because
physicians simultaneously, in January 1994, negotiated an increase of their fees, slightly
higher than the increase of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for GP o¢ce visits, but
slightly lower for the two other physician services. This variation in relative prices will
prove to be important for purposes of identi…cation discussed below.
The descriptive statistics di¤er slightly between 1993 and 1994. This is because
the number of a¢liated is not constant in each federation: people may move, decide
to change a¢liation to another sickness fund or they may die. Even if Gent has a
13This average is calculated by dividing the number of visits by the number of entitled individuals in
a group. One entitled individual may refer to several individuals, since the consumption of dependants
(e.g. spouse or children) cannot be distinguished.
14Liège is the largest city in Wallonia, the region in the south of Belgium in which French is spoken.
Gent is the second largest city in Flanders, the Northern region in Belgium in which Flemish (Dutch) is
spoken.
15In order to make the copayment increases socially acceptable, two types of income related stop-loss
arrangements (the ’social deductible’ and the ’…scal deductible’) were simultaneously adopted. These
impose an upper limit on the total charge of copayments to be supported by the patients. Our data do
not allow to identify individuals (if any) who attained this upper limit and for whom therefore the degree
of cost-sharing drops to zero. This could bias our estimator. However, those individuals represent only a
marginal fraction of all patients. Moreover, few patients were aware of this mechanism at the time of its
introduction, since information transmission was poor in this initial period and the excess expenditures
are only reimbursed ex post.
6smaller population than Liège, the Christian sickness fund seems to count more a¢liates
than in the Flemish than in the Walloon city. This corresponds to a general pattern
in Belgium. The Christian sickness fund is traditionally more dominant in Flanders
and the Socialist sickness fund is more important in Wallonia. Within the sample, the
share of the youngest age group (age < 30) is larger than the two other age groups
(30 · age < 50 and age ¸ 50) which are roughly equally represented. The older age
groups contain proportionally less entitled individuals, because dependent spouses, more
numerous within these age groups, are not recorded as separate individuals. Men are
generally identi…ed as the head of the household, explaining the higher fraction of men
in charge of dependants. The earnings are only reported for individuals belonging to
the social category ’tip’. Finally, observe that the vast majority are ’tip’ and that the
control group (’vipo pref’) represents only a small fraction of the total sample.
The average number of visits to or by the physician according to the treatment status
are the variables of interest in this study. For men, this number is larger for all three
types of visits if one is a member of the control group. This is most pronounced for visits
of general practitioner (GP) at home: this number is nearly …ve times as large as the
corresponding …gure for the treatment group. For women, the control group visits GP
and specialists less at the o¢ce, but this is more than compensated by the increase of
GP home visits. The GP visits these women nearly six times more often at their home
than women in the treatment group.
One could argue that this di¤erent pattern in the demand for physician services is
induced by the signi…cantly lower co-payment rates to be paid by the control group (see
Table 2). Moreover, the relatively low price di¤erential between GP home and o¢ce
visits is likely to more than outweigh the di¤erential time costs between these services
for the majority of the patients, especially for those belonging to the control group. The
latter would explain the pronouncedly higher average number of GP home visits for
controls. However, this di¤erent pattern could also re‡ect a di¤erential in the structural
health conditions or in the preferences between the two groups.
By exploiting the di¤erential price variation between 1993 and 1994 and by (reason-
ably) assuming that both the structural health conditions and preferences are constant
over time, we can disentangle both explanations. For, any di¤erence in the time evolution
of the number of visits between the two groups cannot be explained by time-constant
factors. Moreover, in order to eliminate the e¤ect of time factors, such as a ‡ew epi-
demic, a¤ecting the consumption pattern of both groups proportionally, we subtract
the time evolution of the control group from the one of the treatment group. The re-
maining di¤erential estimates, for the treatment group, the e¤ect of the increase in the
co-payment rate between 1993 and 1994 on the demand for physician services. This is
the di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DD) estimator of the price e¤ect discussed in the following
section.
74 Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences (DD) Estimators
We could calculate the DD on the basis of the average evolutions of physician visits
of the treatment and the control group as a whole. However, this does not exploit all
available information and is therefore not e¢cient. We can calculate, for each type of
physician visit, many such DD estimators, since we can distinguish sub-groups within
these control and treatment groups. By crossing the indicator variables reported in Table
2 one can deduce that M0 = 10 of such sub-groups can be formed for the control group
and M1 = 58 for the treatment group. In this sub-section we show how these 68 sub-
groups can be combined to form the E¢cient DD estimator. Subsequently, we propose an
alternative speci…cation for the dependent variable of the DD estimator. We do so, since
we show in Section 5 that such a speci…cation allows a decomposition of the DD point
estimates income and substitution e¤ects if the Rotterdam system describes the demand
for physician services. We denote this speci…cation by the ’Rotterdam DD estimator’. In
a third subsection, we argue that higher earnings groups behave signi…cantly di¤erently
from other ones and that this justi…es restricting the DD estimator to the lower earnings
groups only. Moreover, heterogeneous behaviour justi…es the introduction of interaction
e¤ects. Finally, we compare our estimation strategy and results to those of Van de
Voorde et al. (2001) on similar data for Belgium.
4.1 The E¢cient DD Estimator
We introduce the following notation: i = 1 for GP o¢ce visits, i = 2 for GP home
visits and i = 3 for specialist visits; d = 0 for the controls and d = 1 for the treated;
m = 1;2;:::Md for each sub-group belonging to treatment group d; t = 0 for the year
1993 and t = 1 for the year 1994. The average demand for a visit of type i for individuals
belonging to sub-group m and treatment group d in the year t is denoted as qimdt and
its growth rate by ¢lnqimd. Without loss of generality, this growth rate can be speci…ed







i are unknown parameters. If we assume that !0
imd is a random unob-






= 0, then ¯0
i is the expected value of the DD estimator:16
¯0
i = E (¢lnqim1 ¡ ¢lnqim0) (2)
16If the e¤ect di¤ers among members of the treatment group, the DD estimator identi…es the Latent
Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE). This is the average e¤ect of those individuals in the treatment group
who are induced to change their demand for physician services following the price change (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994). In the remainder of this paper we either assume a constant treatment e¤ect or a
treatment e¤ect that varies parametrically with the size of the budget share attributed to the service
(see the ’Rotterdam DD estimator’ below).
8With this assumption (1) de…nes a regression equation for which Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) yields an unbiased estimate of ¯0
i. However, since our sample is …nite, we do not






b qimdt (n) is the realisation of the random number of visits of type i in the year t demanded
by individual n belonging to group (m;d) and Nmdt is the number of individuals in the
sample belonging to group (m;d) in the year t. If we replace ¢lnqimd by ¢ln b qimd, the
relation (1) is no longer exact. This suggests estimation by the Minimum Chi-Square
method (Berkson, 1944; Amemiya, 1981; more recently, Cockx, 1997; Cockx and Ridder,
2001). For, expanding ¢ln b qimd in a Taylor expansion around (qimd0;qimd1) yields
b y0






imd represents an approximation error. Generalised Least Squares (GLS) yields
an asymptotically e¢cient estimator of the parameters in regression equation (4) and,
as such, the E¢cient DD estimator, b ¯
0
i. In Appendix 1 we explain how one can …nd
an estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the residual terms to construct a feasible
GLS estimator.
The weighted sum of squared residuals (WSSR) can be used as a goodness-of-…t test
statistic, testing whether the estimated model is to be rejected against the saturated
model. It is distributed Â2 with M0 + M1 ¡ P degrees of freedom (DF), where P is the
number of estimated parameters (see e.g. Amemiya, 1981).
The DD estimates are reported in column 0 of Tables 3a and 3b, respectively for
men and women. The goodness-of-…t test statistic indicates that the estimated model
cannot be rejected against the saturated: the P-value is 66% for men and 87% for
women. According to these estimates, the price increase a¤ected the demand for all
three types of physician services negatively. However, for men, the e¤ect is insigni…cant
(at the 5% level) for GP o¢ce visits and, for women, it’s insigni…cant for specialist visits.
Observe also that the e¤ect on the demand for GP home visits is the largest, even if the
proportional price increase was the smallest (see Table 2). This suggests higher price
sensitivity for home visits.
4.2 The Rotterdam DD Estimator
Below we decompose the DD estimator in income and substitution e¤ects. To this pur-
pose, we will specify the Rotterdam demand system. In this speci…cation the dependent
variable does not correspond to the one de…ned in regression equation (4) above, b y0
imd.
We therefore propose a DD estimator de…ned with respect to this alternative dependent
variable. In fact the dependent variable in the Rotterdam model pre-multiplies b y0
imd by
a moving average of the budget share spent on service i, b wimd.
Introduce the following notation. If pidt denotes the price of this service for an
individual belonging to treatment group d at time t, then for an individual belonging











The moving average of the budget share is de…ned between t = 0 and t = 1, such that
wimd ´ (wimd0 + wimd1)=2 (7)
Replacing population averages by their estimates, this yields the following alternative to
regression equation (4):
b y1






i is the expected value of the ’Rotterdam DD estimator’. Again the parameters
of this regression equation can be estimated e¢ciently by GLS (see Appendix 2 for
details).
In column 1 of Tables 3a and 3b the DD estimates are reported for men and women
respectively. To facilitate comparison with the previous DD estimates reported in column
0, we also report the parameter estimates divided by the average budget share among
the treated. From these we can conclude that the DD estimators are not very sensitive
to the model speci…cation: the point estimates of the two models lie in each others 95%
con…dence intervals. Observe, however, contrary to speci…cation 0, the price reform now
seems to have reduced the demand for GP o¢ce visits for men signi…cantly. On the
basis of the Â2 goodness-of-…t test statistic neither model can be rejected. For women
the Rotterdam DD model …ts best (a P-value of 97% versus 87%), but for men the
initial DD regression model (4) performs slightly better (a P-value of 66% versus 64%).
In the sequel, we only retain the Rotterdam DD model, since only this model allows the
announced decomposition of the price e¤ects.
4.3 The Rotterdam DD Estimator Accounting for Heterogeneous Be-
haviour
Up to now we assumed that the behaviour both within and between treatment groups
is homogeneous. In this sub-section we depart from this assumption by allowing both,
the intercept and the slope of regression equation (8), to interact with the discrete
explanatory variables described in Table 2. We start o¤ with a model in which all …rst-
level interaction e¤ects are allowed for. Such a model contains, apart from the coe¢cients
for the reference group, four interaction e¤ects for the intercept (federation (Gent),
age 30 ¡ 50, age > 50, household type (with dependants)) and eight for the slope (the
previous four plus the social status (tip) and the earning levels in euro: 0 < E · 12;500;
1012;500 · E <= 25;000; E > 25;000). This model (not reported) is estimated to test
whether interaction e¤ects can be ignored.
We proceed in two steps. In a …rst step we test whether the slope interaction e¤ects
can be set to zero at a P-level of 5%. Since substitution e¤ects relate the three physician
services (see Section 5), we only retain zero interactions to the extent that these cannot be
rejected for all three services jointly. The di¤erence between the WSSR of the restricted
and the unrestricted model is distributed Â2 with as many degrees of freedom as the
number of restricted parameters. In this …rst step, we cannot reject a model in which
all slope interactions but three (times three for each service) are set to zero. For men,
the remaining interactions consist of the two highest earnings classes and the federation;
for women, these coincide with the three earnings classes referring to strictly positive
earnings.
Recall that the control group, by construction, does not contain any individuals with
strictly positive reported earnings. The signi…cant interaction e¤ects for the groups with
positive earnings suggest therefore that the behaviour of these individuals cannot be
compared to those belonging to the control group. To avoid bias induced by this non-
comparability, we therefore exclude the higher earnings groups from any further analysis.
For women, this involves all groups with strictly positive earnings; for men, only the two
highest earnings classes are eliminated. This reduces the number of cells available for
analysis considerably: from 204 to 132 and 96, respectively for men and women. It is on
this restricted sample that we apply our second step of the testing procedure.
In this second step, we estimate again the model with all …rst level interaction e¤ects.
Subsequently, we test whether we can constrain this model by setting intercept and slope
coe¢cients to zero according to the above-mentioned rule. As such, we impose all but
two (for each physician service) interaction e¤ects to zero. All slope interactions can
be ignored, implying that, within this restricted sample, all groups reacted similarly to
the price reform. Intercept interactions indicate that expenditures on physician services
would have evolved di¤erently between groups even in the absence of a price reform.
These reveal (not reported) that expenditures growth of all three physician services for
men and women in charge of dependants was lower than for other groups. Similarly,
this growth was below the reference for men aged between 30 and 50 and for women
a¢liated to the federation of Gent (rather than Liège). This model, reported in column
1¤ of Tables 5a and 5b, respectively for men and women, could not be rejected against
the full interaction model at a P-value of 6% for men and 26% for women. Any further
restriction is rejected at the 5% level.
It is striking that the DD point estimates are much smaller in absolute value as
compared to models 0 and 1. Moreover, whereas in model 1 only specialist visits by
women were not signi…cantly (at a 5% level) a¤ected by the price reform, now only the
coe¢cients of GP home visits for men and of GP o¢ce visits for women are signi…cant.
We can test whether the parameters of interest, i.e. ¯1
i (i = 1;2;3) of model 1 and
1¤ are signi…cantly di¤erent. For, under the null hypothesis of equal coe¢cients, model
1 is consistent and more e¢cient than model 1¤; but under the alternative hypothesis it
yields an inconsistent estimator. This suggests comparison on the basis of a Hausman
11test (Hausman, 1978).17 On this basis we reject the null hypothesis of equality with a
P-value of 0:06% for men (Â2(3) = 17:3) and of 0:25% for women (Â2(3) = 14:3).
We conclude that our …ndings resemble those reported by Chiappori et al. (1998)
for France. The demand for GP home visits is more price elastic than the other two
physician services. We estimate that, in spite of a lower proportional price increase, the
reform reduced the demand for this service most: as compared to the control group,
the demand of the treatment group decreased by 14% for men and by 9% for women.
However, for women this estimate is very imprecise and is not maintained when we
restrict the Rotterdam DD model to allow for a decomposition in income and substitution
e¤ects (see Section 5.2 and 5.3 below). The demand for other physician services is not
signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, except for GP o¢ce visits by women, the demand for
which decreased by 7%.
Contrary to Chiappori et al. (1998), we do not believe that the time costs, not ac-
counted for in the price of o¢ce visits, can explain the di¤erential response: these are
…xed over time and eliminated by di¤erencing. We explain the di¤erential price sensi-
tivity of the demand for physician services in terms of di¤ering income and substitution
e¤ects.
4.4 A Comparison with Van de Voorde et al. (2001)
Van de Voorde et al. (2001) also exploit grouped data on physician visits originating
from the same sickness fund. Their data set is richer in that they have access to pooled
data on a period of 10 years (1986-1995)18 and this for all regional o¢ces in Belgium.
Recall that our data only refer to 1993 and 1994 and to only two regional o¢ces, Liège
and Gent. On the other hand, these researchers could only distinguish between three
categories of users (tip, vipo nopr and vipo pref ) and could therefore neither control for
the sex of the user of physcian services nor for any other explanatory variables, as in our
study (Section 4.3).
Van de Voorde et al. (2001) estimate both, a DD model and a level model containing
a linear time trend as control for time-varying factors other than prices. Their DD
estimates of the price elasticity are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero if the control
group (vipo pref ) is contrasted to one treatment group (vipo nopr), but signi…cantly
negative if compared with the other (tip). This is consistent with our …ndings, since we
also found larger treatment e¤ects for the highest earnings groups within the contributing
population, tip (Section 4.3). Van de Voorde et al. (2001) conclude, as we do for
the higher earning groups, that the control group (vipo pref ) is not adequate for the
contributing population (tip).19 The authors argue, however, that the control group is
neither adequate for the other treatment group (vipo nopr), since they ”are really a very
17To ensure that the di¤erence of the variance-covariance matrices between the two models is posi-
tive de…nite, we re-estimate model 1 imposing for the observations retained in model 1
¤ the estimated
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals of the consistent model 1
¤ and apply the test to this model.
18This longer time period is, however, not much more informative, since the copayments hardly changed
apart from the 1994 increase.
19Note that this does not necessarily imply that the sensitivity of demand for the tip group is higher
than for the controls. A larger treatment e¤ect could also re‡ect a more pronounced autonomous decrease
12selective group among the socially weakest” (p. 13). We contest this conclusion, since
the homogeneity of the treatment e¤ect for the lower earnings groups including vipo nopr
(Section 4.3) suggests that the control group is only inappropriate for the higher earnings
groups.
Van de Voorde et al. (2001) have more con…dence in the estimates of their level model
yielding for the contributing population (tip) signi…cantly negative price elasticities of the
same order of magnitude of those found in the Rand experiment in the US. We question
the validity of this conclusion, since it crucially depends on the assumption that the time
e¤ects can be completely captured by a linear time trend.20 We rather conclude that we
cannot identify the impact of the increase of co-payments for the higher earning groups
on the basis of this natural experiment. We can do so for the lower income groups,
however.
There is a more fundamental reason why we do not believe in the elasticities reported
in the above-mentioned article. The authors implicitly assume that the relative prices of
the three physician services were a¤ected in the same proportion, such that the treatment
e¤ect of physician service i only depends on the own proportional price change (¢lnpid).
This assumption is incorrect (see Table 2). Consequently, if substitution e¤ects between
these services are non-zero, the parameter estimates do not re‡ect the price elasticities
of demand for these services.21 The correct price elasticities can only be deduced from
the estimated parameters of a demand system capturing the substitution e¤ects induced
by the changes in relative prices.
5 The Demand System
We now propose a method to decompose the price e¤ects in income and substitution
e¤ects. To that purpose we rely on the classic theory of consumer demand and assume
that consumers behave according to the principles of two-stage budgeting. In the …rst
stage the consumer decides upon the budget to allocate to expenditures on physician
services. In the second stage the consumer decides which type of physician service he
will buy taking the budget allocated in the …rst stage as given.
The classic theory assumes that the consumer decides in a certain environment.
The demand for health care is, however, typically conditioned on the realisation of an
uncertain event, i.e. on illness. We provide two justi…cations for our approach. First,
the decision at the second stage does not involve uncertainty. The choice of the type of
physician service is only taken after one has become ill and is conditional on a budget
determined under uncertainty in the …rst stage. Since by lack of adequate data we cannot
impose much theoretical structure, we can interpret the …rst stage as a reduced form of
a model of demand under uncertainty.
in demand for the tip group.
20The authors are aware of this limitation, since they report it in the main text (p.9).
21Equation (22) below reveals why a constant elasticity demand equation depending just on own
prices is only justi…ed if substitution e¤ects are zero (8j : ²
¤
ijmd = 0) or if the proportional price change
is uniform (8j : ¢lnpjd = ¢lnPGd).
13Second, following the literature on ”physician agency” (McGuire, 2000), one could
argue that it is the GP or specialist, rather than the patient, who decides on the quantity
and type of medical care services consumed. The physician could then determine, ex ante,
for each group of patients, in function of prices and of their personal characteristics, both,
the average health expenditures and their allocation among the di¤erent services. If these
groups coincide approximately with those constructed for the empirical analysis, then
the classic allocation model under certainty will apply to these grouped data.
In fact, the by European standards extremely high density of physicians in Belgium
is favourable to the second interpretation: In 1995 Belgium had 660 inhabitants per
practising GP and 630 per specialist (Van de Voorde et al. 2001, p. 4). Moreover, since
the empirical analysis is restricted to two large cities, this density will be even larger.
The outline of this section is as follows. We …rst brie‡y recapitulate the structure of
the Rotterdam demand system in the second budgeting stage and discuss identi…cation
and estimation. Subsequently, we describe the …rst budgeting stage and explain how the
parameters of this stage can be estimated by imposing appropriate restrictions on the
’Rotterdam DD estimator’. In a third sub-section we present the estimation results of
the Rotterdam model. Finally, we calculate the gross e¢ciency gain of the price reform
and decompose it in its determinants.
5.1 The Second Budgeting Stage of the Rotterdam Model
We assume that the Rotterdam model is on average a correct description of the behaviour
of patients demanding physician services.22 To eliminate …xed e¤ects we formulate the
Rotterdam model in its di¤erential form:



















ij = wimd[²ijmd +´imdwjmd] (12)
where ai is the autonomous growth rate of the demand for service i (in deviation from
the autonomous growth rate of average expenditures on physician services, a0, de…ned
in Section 5.2), bi is the marginal propensity to spend on the ith service, sij is the (i;j)th
term of the Slutsky substitution matrix S, and ei is a random term, allowing deviations
from rational behaviour. ´imd; ²¤
ijmd and ²ijmd are, respectively, the expenditure, the
22In a sensitivity analysis we compared the …ndings resulting from the Rotterdam speci…cation to
the CBS model of Keller and van Driel (1985). This model did not …t the data well and is therefore
not reported. A discussion of the analysis and results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
As to the Almost Ideal Demand system (AID) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), we only estimated
the second stage OLS version, because negativity (see (16) below) was violated and cannot be imposed
globally on AID.
14compensated and the uncompensated price elasticities. From (10) it is clear that the
regressor of bi is an index of proportional change in real total expenditure. Moreover, it
can also be regarded as a measure of change in utility, so that the Rotterdam demand
equations (9) represent Hicksian demands (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a, p.68).
Another advantage of this formulation is that the restrictions imposed by theory of
rational choice can be expressed in terms of …xed parameters (bi;sij). This makes it









sij = 0 ( Adding-up ) (13)
X
j
sij = 0 ( Homogeneity ) (14)
sij = sji ( Symmetry ) (15)
x0Sx < 0 ( Negativity ) (16)
To write down an estimable Rotterdam system (9) the di¤erentials are approximated.
We follow Barten (1967) and replace the di¤erential dlnqimd by …rst di¤erences ¢lnqimd
and replace the budget shares by a moving average between t = 0 and t = 1, i.e. by
wid de…ned in (7). Finally, we need to replace the average demand for service i by an
estimate. The estimated dependent variable is denoted by b y1
imd and de…ned by (8) and
(3).
Using (9), a Taylor expansion of b y1















sij¢lnpjd + eimd + uimd (17)
where uimd is the approximation error.
This demand system cannot be estimated as such. First, the adding-up restrictions
(13) imply that the rows of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals add-up to
zero23. The variance-covariance matrix is therefore singular. For estimation purposes,
one demand equation may therefore be deleted: the parameters of the deleted equation
can be derived from the two other ones.
Second, the proportional price variation of each service (¢lnpjd) takes on only two
values for each of the three physician services: one for the control group (d = 0) and
one for the treatment group (d = 1). Consequently, even if we impose homogeneity
(si3 = ¡si1¡si2) and symmetry (s12 = s21), the intercepts and the price variables of the
demand system are linearly dependent. Intuitively, the system of two demand equations
contains only four independent relative price changes (¢lnpjd ¡ ¢lnp3d; j = 1;2; d =
0;1)24, two for each service, to identify 5 parameters (a1;a2;s11;s12 = s21;s22). This is
formally proved in Appendix 3.
23This applies also to the approximation error uimd, because the Taylor expansion is applied to both
the dependent and the …rst independent variable. The latter is multiplied by bi, so that after summing
over i the aproximation error of the independent variable cancels out with that of the dependent variable
(see Appendix 3).
24By homogeneity, the price variation of one good (j = 3) is taken as numeraire.
15To resolve this identi…cation problem we propose theoretical restrictions of the fol-
lowing kind: a1 = 0, a2 = 0 or a3 = 0 (i.e. a1 = ¡a2 by (13)). Such a restriction implies
that the autonomous growth in the demand for service i equals the autonomous growth
of the average expenditures on physician services, i.e. a0 de…ned in Section 5.2. To avoid
that this restriction is completely arbitrary, we choose the one that renders the demand
system compatible with the corresponding ’Rotterdam DD estimator’. This procedure
is explained in the next sub-section.
In the empirical application the Slutsky substitution matrix S is not negative de…nite
(16) without imposing it to be so. In the estimation we therefore impose negativity by
a Cholesky decomposition (Barten and Geyskens, 1975). This requires estimation by a
non-linear GLS method. The estimation method is further explained in Appendix 4.
5.2 The First Budgeting Stage of The Rotterdam Model
In the …rst budgeting stage the consumer (induced by the physician) decides how to
allocate his total available budget to di¤erent groups of goods and services, among which
the budget to spend on physician services.25 Our dataset neither contains information on
the total available budget, nor does it on expenditures on other goods or services. The
…rst budgeting stage can therefore only formulated under very restrictive assumptions.
First, we assume that the total budget was either constant or has grown at an average
uniform rate over the period of analysis. As such, the income e¤ects are captured by the
constant term. Second, we assume that there are no interaction e¤ects with other goods
or services.
Under these assumptions the …rst stage of the demand for physician services can be













where a0 captures the autonomous growth rate of average expenditures on physician





where b bj is an estimate obtained from the second budgeting stage. To the extent that
the two higher mentioned (restrictive) assumptions are satis…ed, b0 can be interpreted
as the uncompensated price elasticity of demand.26 Finally, the last two terms denote,
respectively, the unobserved group e¤ects and the approximation errors of the Taylor
expansion.
25See e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 127-133) for the derivation of the …rst stage Rotterdam
model in di¤erential form.
26The compensated price elasticity of demand in this …rst stage could only be obtained by de‡ating the
evolution of the total budget by an appropriate price index. This index must vary between the treatment
and control group and therefore violates the …rst of our two assumptions.
16The above-mentioned two-step GLS estimation procedure could be directly applied
to (18). However, we prefer an indirect estimation procedure obtained by restricting
the ’Rotterdam DD estimator’ discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. As such, we can test
whether the identifying assumptions required for the estimation of the second stage
model (17) are reasonable or, on the contrary, must be rejected.
Consider the Rotterdam DD regression model de…ned in (8). Interestingly, if the
Rotterdam model is a correct description of the demand for physician services, then the
estimated parameters of the second budgeting stage (17) impose testable restrictions on
this modi…ed DD regression model. Indeed, inserting the …rst budgeting stage model
(18) in the second stage one (17) corresponds to imposing the following restrictions on
the intercepts and slopes of the Rotterdam DD model (8):
®1






i = b bi [b0(¢lnPG1 ¡ ¢lnPG0)] +
3 X
j=1
b sij (¢lnpj1 ¡¢lnpj0): (21)
Note that these restrictions are consistent, since prices of each physician service vary
only with the treatment status. As such, both sides of the two restrictions are constants.
For i = 1;2;3, this reduces the number of parameters in ’homogeneous’ Rotterdam DD
model (8) from 6 to 6=3 = 2: only a0 and b0 remain unknown parameters. If we use
the (consistent) estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the unrestricted model (8)
for the GLS estimation of the restricted model, then, under the null hypothesis, the
di¤erence between the WSSR of the restricted and the restricted model is distributed




. If we allow intercept interactions,
as in model 1*, than this test statistic is distributed Â2(8).27 Moreover, if not rejected,
the estimation of the restricted model directly yields estimates for the parameters of the
…rst budgeting stage of the Rotterdam model (18). If rejected, this suggests that an
inappropriate identifying restriction has been imposed on the second budgeting stage.
Among the un-rejected models we choose the model that …ts the unrestricted DD model
(8) most closely on the basis of the Â2 goodness-of-…t test statistic.
5.3 The Estimation Results
Since the estimation results reported in Section 4.3 imply heterogeneous behaviour, we
eliminate the higher earnings groups from the sample and allow the same intercept
interactions, both for the …rst and second budgeting stage, as imposed on the DD model
1¤. Note, imposing a1 = 0, a2 = 0 and/or a3 = 0 on the intercept of reference group is
a su¢cient identifying restriction. We need not impose it on the interaction e¤ects.
27The unrestricted DD model counts 4 parameters rather than 2 (+2 interactions) for each of the 3
services (4 £ 3 = 12) and the restricted model 12=3 = 4 (12 ¡ 4 = 8).
17We subsequently report the estimation results of the …rst and second budgeting stage
in Tables 3a and 3b (column 1¤r), and Tables 4a and 4b, for men and women respectively.
For men, only for the model on which we impose a1 = 0; the restrictions (20) and (21)
are not rejected (P-value = 7.4%). For women, we retain the model with a3 = 0 as
identifying restriction (P-value = 6.7%). The DD point estimates corresponding to this
restricted model are reported in Table 3a and 3b. Because of the restrictions these are
more precise and, although they remain within the common con…dence intervals, they
deviate from those estimated within the unrestricted model (column 1*). It strikes that
the point estimates of the demand for home visits are smaller: ¡8% for men (in stead of
¡14%) and close to 0% for women (in stead of ¡9%). Besides, the demand for specialist
visits by men is now signi…cantly reduced (¡7% in stead of ¡3%) by the price reform.
Note that the restricted DD model (18) …ts the data quite well: it cannot be rejected
against the saturated model at a signi…cance level of 39% for men and 19% for women.
Even if the price increase had a signi…cant negative impact on the demand for some
physician services, the price elasticity on the demand for physician services as a whole
is quite small: the estimate of b0 in the …rst budgeting stage model (18) indicates that a
100% price increase of all three physician services (¢lnPGd = :01) decreases expenditures
(signi…cantly) by 13% for men and (insigni…cantly) by 3% for women. This is much
lower than the price elasticity of ¡:31 for outpatient services reported for comparable
cost sharing rates in the Rand experiment in the US. However, recall that we can only
report elasticities for the lower income groups (see Section 4.3 and 4.4). Since in the
US the use of outpatient services is reported to be signi…cantly lower for lower income
groups (Newhouse et al., 1993, p. 262) our …ndings are not necessarily con‡icting with
those of Rand experiment. By contrast, the level model of Van de Voorde et al (2001)
reports for the non-contributing population (vipo) on average larger elasticities than
those reported in this study. For the DD model, the contrast between vipo pref and vipo
nopr yields lowers elasticities. However, these authors did not account for substitution
e¤ects induced by the change in relative prices.
The above mentioned elasticities are averages. If we insert (18) in (17) and divide
both sides by the budget share, b wimd, we obtain b0´imd, the elasticity of the demand for
service i with respect to a uniform proportional price increase for all three physician ser-
vices. This elasticity is the average price elasticity b0 multiplied by the income elasticity
of demand in the second budgeting stage ´imd. Table 4a (4b) reports for men (women)
the estimated income elasticity evaluated at the average budget share of the treatment
group. The price elasticity is larger than the average for luxury services (´imd > 1) and
smaller for necessities (´imd < 1).
Home visits are luxuries both for men and women: the income elasticity is respectively
1:38 and 2:24. The corresponding price elasticities are therefore ¡:18 and ¡:08, the
largest of all three physician services. In contrast, GP o¢ce visits are necessities. The
income and price elasticities for men (women) are much smaller, respectively :47 (:32)
and ¡:06 (¡:01). Finally, visits to the specialist are luxuries for men (´i = 1:11), but not
signi…cantly, and necessities for women (´i = :55). The corresponding price elasticities
are ¡:14 for men and ¡:02 for women.
18The policy reform did not, however, increase the prices of all three physician services
in the same proportion. According to theory, changes in relative prices should induce
substitution e¤ects. The Slutsky matrix in the Rotterdam model (17) re‡ect these. Re-
call, apart from theoretical restrictions ((13), (14) and (15)) necessary for identi…cation,
we were also required to impose negativity (16) on all estimations (see Appendix 3 for
details).
Observe that the Slutsky matrix is very imprecisely estimated. This is because the
natural experiment does not induce su¢cient relative price variation. It is di¢cult to test
the null hypothesis of a zero Slutsky matrix, S, because at the frontier of the parameter
space the test statistic is no longer distributed Â2, asymptotically. However, we can test
whether the restrictions (20) and (21) are rejected if we impose S = 0. For men, this
test results in a higher P-value than for the model with the non-zero Slutsky matrix:
11:9% as compared to 7:4%. In contrast, for women the restrictions must be rejected
(P-value = 5:0% as compared to 6:7%). This is consistent with the, in absolute value,
much larger point estimates of the Slutsky terms for women.
The imprecision of the parameter estimates makes interpretation hazardous. Never-
theless, we attempt to draw some conclusions. The own price elasticities of the demand
is much larger for GP o¢ce visits (¡:95 for men and ¡2:20 for women) than for the
two other physician services. The sign of cross price elasticities suggests that GP o¢ce
visits are Hicksian substitutes of home visits and specialist visits. GP home visits and
specialist visits are (weak) complements. The latter might re‡ect that very ill individuals
need both to be treated by a GP at home and by a specialist.
We now recapitulate the …ndings. To this purpose, we insert equation (18), describing
the …rst budgeting stage of the Rotterdam model, into the second stage model (17). If
we divide all terms by the budget share of (m;d), b wmd, and neglect the intercept and
residual terms, we obtain
¢ln b qS





The left hand side is the expected proportional e¤ect of the price reform on the demand
for service i of group (m;d). In Table 5 we report a weighted average of this e¤ect over all
treatments.28 Note, in contrast to the restricted ’Rotterdam DD’ estimates, b bi, reported
in column 1¤r of Tables 3a and 3b, this e¤ect is not evaluated the e¤ect in deviation
from the e¤ect of the price reform on the control group. Since prices were also slightly
increased for the control group, the total e¤ects reported in Table 5 deviate slightly from
the ones in Tables 3a and 3b.
The right hand side of equation (22) decomposes this total e¤ect in income and sub-
stitution e¤ects. This decomposition con…rms that substitution e¤ects are less important
for men than for women. In fact, for men, the column reporting the income e¤ects is
a good predictor of the total e¤ect. By contrast, substitution e¤ects are important for
28We replace parameters by their point estimates. The e¤ect for each group m1 is weighted by each
group’s fraction of the total number of service units of type i demanded in 1993. In contrast to the
estimation, we extrapolate our …ndings by maintaining the higher earning groups in the calculation.
19women. For instance, for GP o¢ce visits the negative e¤ect is nearly completely induced
by the change in relative prices: the positive substitution e¤ects induced by the price
increases of the other two physician services are large (:42 + :37 = :79), but cannot
compensate for the even larger own price e¤ect (¡:85). Also, patients substitute o¢ce
visits for home visits (+50%) and, for women, this e¤ect is so large that it dominates
slightly all three, the negative own price e¤ect (¡25%), the negative e¤ect induced by
the complementariness with specialist visits (¡22%) and the income e¤ect (¡3%). This
essentially results from both, a relatively higher substitution elasticity (²¤
21 > ²¤
22) and
that the proportional price increase of home visits was the lowest of all three. Finally,
even if the prices of specialist visits increase proportionally more than those of GP o¢ce
visits, the substitution elasticity, ²¤
31 is relatively so high that positive substitution e¤ect
induced by the price increase of GP o¢ce visits (+17%) also more than compensates the
same three sources of negative e¤ects. Consequently, for women, the change of relative
prices implied by the reform caused consumption of GP home visits and specialist visits
to increase rather than to decrease.
5.4 The Gross E¢ciency Gain of the Price Reform
The increase of the own contribution charged for the consumption of physician services
could bene…t to society to the extent that it reduces the excess demand induced by
insurance. In this section we provide an estimate of this e¢ciency gain.
This estimate should be regarded as an upper bound for a number of reasons. First,
data limitations do not allow weighing the e¢ciency gain against the cost of increased
risk induced by the lower health insurance coverage. We can therefore only estimate the
gross e¢ciency gain. Moreover, for similar reasons, we cannot account for the income
e¤ect of the price increase on total expenditures or for the substitution e¤ects inducing
the demand for other (health) goods and services to increase. Feldstein (1973) argued
that the cost of medical services should fall as a consequence of less health insurance
coverage. This increases the e¢ciency gain. However, this argument does not hold in the
Belgian institutional context. As mentioned in Section 2, prices of health services are not
set freely, but …xed nationally in negotiations involving the government, representatives
of the sickness funds and of the physicians. Between January 1993 and 1994, these
parties negotiated a price increase corresponding approximately to the increase of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).
By contrast, we under-estimate the gross social bene…t if the price elasticity of de-
mand increases with earnings, since we extrapolate our …ndings for the low earning
groups.
The gross e¢ciency gain, EG, as a proportion of total expenditures on physician
































where kidt (t = 0;1) is the cost of physician service i for treatment group d at time t
and pidt=kidt the corresponding co-payment rate. Since the demand for service i falls






is the number of units by
which it falls. This is valued at the cost of the physician service to society net of the loss
in consumer surplus per euro of reduced consumption, calculated in the usual Harberger
fashion.
Calculated as such, the total gross e¢ciency gain, EG, is 2:3% of total expenditures.
This is small for real price increases ranging between 35% and 60%. Moreover, recall
that this …gure must regarded as an upper bound. Since the prices of the control group
hardly changed, 99% of this e¢ciency gain is generated by the fall in consumption of the
treatment group. If we calculate the e¢ciency gain relative to the total expenditures of
the treated only, it increases to 3:2%. Finally, note that the largest share of the e¢ciency
gain, i.e. 70%, is induced by an altered consumption pattern of men. This re‡ects the
di¤erent pattern of price e¤ects between men and women reported in Table 5.
If we use the decomposition formula (22) of the proportional fall in consumption,
¡¢ln b qS
imd, and insert this in (23) we can also decompose the gross e¢ciency gain.
In Table 6 we report this decomposition for men and women separately. To facilitate
reading, we normalise the total e¢ciency gain to a value of 100.
Consistent with the …ndings reported in Table 5, for men, the total gain is largely
(103%) induced by the common average price increase of all three services (i.e. by the
income e¤ects) and not by a change in relative prices (i.e. by substitution e¤ects, ¡3%).
For women, the change of relative prices accounts for as much as 21%.
For men, the e¢ciency gain is nearly entirely (96%) caused by a fall in expenditures
on GP home visits (45%) and o¢ce visits to specialists (51%). For women, in contrast,
society bene…ts only from the reduction in the number of GP o¢ce visits. Substitution
e¤ects induce the demand for GP home visits and for o¢ce visits to specialists to increase.
This reduces the e¢ciency gain by 16% and 18%, respectively.
The reported gross e¤ects of the changes in relative prices are very large. For instance,
the e¢ciency gain induced by the own price e¤ect of GP o¢ce visits for women is 16 times
as large as the total gain. The model predicts that if only the price of GP o¢ce visits
had been increased in 1994, then this could have yielded a much larger gross e¢ciency
gain for women: 277% induced by the own price e¤ect and the substitution e¤ects on
the other two physician services to which one must add the positive income e¤ect of this
price change (7%)29. However, the large imprecision by which the Slutsky terms were
estimated calls for caution. Further research is required to con…rm these …ndings.
6 Conclusion
This study analysed the e¤ect of a substantial increase of the co-payments of three types
of physician services on the 1st of January 1994 in Belgium: GP o¢ce and home visits
and o¢ce visits to the specialist. We proposed a DD estimator of the e¤ect of the price
increase on the demand for these services and showed how it could be decomposed into
one induced by the uniform proportional increase of co-payments for all three services
29This …gure is calculated by setting dlnPGd = b b1dlnp1d in the three terms re‡ecting the income
e¤ects.
21(i.e. an income e¤ect) and into a number of substitution e¤ects induced by the change
in relative prices.
The average elasticity of a common proportional price increase is ¡:13 for men (rang-
ing from ¡:06 for GP o¢ce visits to ¡:14 for specialist visits and ¡:18 for GP home visits)
and ¡:03 for women (ranging from ¡:01 to ¡:02 and ¡:08 for the same services). This
is low if one compares it to the average price elasticity of ¡:31 for outpatient services
reported for comparable cost sharing rates in the Rand experiment in the US (Newhouse
et al., 1993). However, the natural experiment on which this study relies, identi…es
the price elasticity of lower income groups only. Since the Rand experiment reports an
increase in the use of outpatient services for higher income groups, the …ndings of this
study are not necessarily di¤erent. By contrast, the level model of Van de Voorde et al
(2001) reports for Belgium for the non-contributing population (vipo) on average larger
elasticities than those reported in this study. For the DD model, the contrast between
vipo pref and vipo nopr yields lowers elasticities. However, these authors did not account
for substitution e¤ects induced by the change in relative prices.
As Chiappori et al. (1998) for France, GP home visits are found to be more price
elastic than the other two physician services, at least for men. We claim, however, that
the higher elasticity follows from GP home visits being a luxury, rather than from the
lower time costs, as suggested by Chiappori et al. (1998). For women, a GP home visit
is also a luxury, but the income e¤ect is more than o¤set by the substitution e¤ects
induced by the relative price increases of the two other physician services. GP o¢ce
visits are necessities and specialist visits are only luxuries for men.
The e¤ects of the relative price changes are large, especially for women. For women,
the positive substitution e¤ects of the increase in the cost-sharing rates on the demand
for GP home visits and specialist visits even more than compensate the negative income
e¤ects. GP o¢ce visits are Hicksian substitutes for specialist and GP home visits. GP
home visits and specialist visits are (weak) complements. Nevertheless, these …ndings
should be con…rmed in further research, because the parameter estimates were very
imprecise.
Despite the substantial increase of the co-payment rates, we estimate that an upper
bound for the gross e¢ciency gain of the price reform is only 2:3%.30 This gain results
essentially (70%) from the fall in health expenditures for men. To obtain an estimate
of the net e¢ciency gain, we must deduct the e¢ciency loss of the increased risk due to
the lower insurance coverage from this …gure. This means that the net welfare gain of
the reform, if any, is surely very modest.
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Appendix 1: The E¢cient DD Estimator
GLS is an asymptotically e¢cient estimator of the parameters of regression model
(4). This requires further speci…cation and estimation of the variance-covariance matrix







= 0, we allow these unobserved e¤ects to be correlated









where ±xy is the Kronecker delta.
The approximation error À0







t+1 (b qimdt ¡ qimdt)
qimdt
(25)
The higher order terms may be omitted, since it can be shown that its probability limit
for Nmdt (t = 0;1) tending to in…nity converges to zero at a faster rate than the …rst order
terms (Amemiya, 1985, p.276-7). Hence, this omission does not a¤ect the consistency of
the estimator nor its asymptotic distribution.
If we assume that the random number of visits qimdt(n) is independently distributed
across individuals with mean and variance equal to qimdt and, as such, compatible with


















A consistent estimate is obtained by replacing qimdt by b qimdt.
In a similar context, a feasible GLS procedure was proposed by Amemiya and Nold
(1975) and Parks (1980). It consists of two steps. In a …rst step one estimates (4) by
OLS. This allows to calculate, for each d; an estimate of the 3 £ 3 variance-covariance
















26with b e v
0
imd the OLS residual of regression equation (4) and b ¾À0
ijmd the estimate of (26).
Next, observe that the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals in equation (4) is
block-diagonal and that the elements of block (m;d) can be estimated by
b ¾!0
ijd + b ¾À0
ijmd (28)
This estimate is then used in a second step to construct a feasible GLS estimator.
Appendix 2: The Rotterdam DD Estimator
The GLS estimator of regression model (8) is constructed in a similar way. First,
the variance-covariance matrix of the unobserved group e¤ects !1































Assuming again that the random number of visits qimdt (n) is independently distributed






























A consistent estimate is obtained by replacing qimdt by b qimdt and a feasible GLS estimator
is found by the procedure described in Appendix 1.
Appendix 3: Identi…cation of the Second Stage Rotterdam Model
Even if we impose homogeneity (si3 = ¡si1 ¡ si2) and symmetry (s12 = s21), the
intercepts and the price variables of the demand system (17) are linearly dependent. To
see this we rewrite (17) with the mentioned theoretical restrictions in matrix notation:
b y1






















































1 0 ¢ln(p10=p30) ¢ln(p20=p30) 0
1 0 ¢ln(p11=p31) ¢ln(p21=p31) 0
0 1 0 ¢ln(p10=p30) ¢ln(p20=p30)





The reader can verify that det(Z0Z) = 0, implying that ° cannot be uniquely identi…ed
from the data. In contrast, if relative prices, both for the treatments as for the controls
do not vary proportionally and if for some i we impose ai = 0, then identi…cation is
assured.
Appendix 4: The Estimator of the Second Stage Rotterdam Model
The GLS estimator of the second stage Rotterdam model (17) is constructed along
similar lines, but is non-linear because of the negativity constraint (16) that must be
imposed in this analysis. The …rst two moments of the unobserved group e¤ects eimd are


























@qkmdt is de…ned in (30). The second term in the parenthesis accounts for the
approximation error induced by the regressor of the income e¤ect in (17). Speci…ed as
such, the approximation error satis…es the adding-up condition (13):
P3
j=1ujmd = 0.
Since bi is unknown it is replaced by a consistent estimate: the OLS estimate of (17).31
31This induces correlation between the regressors and the error term and will therefore bias the esti-
mator. Consistency is not a¤ected, however.
28In this second budgeting stage the random number of visits qimdt (n) of type i is
no longer independently distributed from the other types, because it is conditioned on
a given budget xmdtn. In order to derive the …rst variance-covariance matrix of the
approximation errors, we therefore assume that at time t, the individual n’s expenditures
on the physician service of type i, pidtqimdtn, follow a multinomial distribution with






= ±mm0±dd0±tt0±nn0xmdtwimdt (±ij ¡ wjmdt) (41)
Since the prices are non-random the distribution of qimdt (n) can be easily deduced.





































If one replaces qimdt by b qimdt, the feasible GLS estimator is found by the procedure
described in Appendix 1.
The estimated Slutsky matrix S is not negative de…nite. We follow Barten and
Geyskens (1975) and impose negativity (16) using a Cholesky decomposition. By homo-
geneity (14) and adding-up (13), we may delete one row and one column from the Slutsky
matrix. The Cholesky decomposition of the remaining matrix on which symmetry (15)






























in which the Cholesky values ¡(h1)
2 and ¡(h2)
2 are negative by construction. Note,
this imposes non-linear restrictions on the Slutsky parameters, requiring the regression
model (17) to be estimated by non-linear GLS.
If the negativity constraint is binding one of the Cholesky values should tend to zero.
However, if it were set exactly to zero the Slutsky matrix and therefore the outer-product
of the …rst derivatives is singular. Since the inverse of the latter matrix is used in our
procedure of numerical optimisation, we choose the algorithm proposed by Marquardt
(1963) allowing the Cholesky value to converge very closely to zero.32
32As a consequence of near-singularity the objective function of the numerical optimisation procedure
is very ‡at and tends to converge too rapidly, i.e. far from the minimum. To overcome this problem, we
…rst estimate the model in which we impose the second Cholesky value to be equal to zero. Subsequently,
we take the parameter values of this …rst stage as initial values, apart from the second Cholesky value,
which is set at a value very close to zero. We then apply the optimisation routine proposed by Marquardt
(1963).
29TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample
Men Women
1993 1994 1993 1994
Age
age < 30 43.6% 43.3% 39.7% 39.3%
30 · age < 50 28.1% 28.5% 27.4% 27.8%
age ¸ 50 28.3% 28.2% 32.9% 32.9%
Federation
Gent 58.6% 58.5% 57.6% 57.6%
Household typea
with dependants 37.7% 37.0% 10.1% 10.5%
vipo and age < 30 1.5% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3%
Earnings (in Euro)b
E = 0 62.4% 65.3% 70.8% 72.8%
0 < E · 12;500 2.3% 2.7% 7.2% 7.5%
12;500 · E <= 25;000 19.4% 17.9% 16.5% 14.5%
E > 25;000 15.9% 14.1% 5.5% 5.2%
Social status
tip 81.6% 81.5% 72.6% 72.4%
vipo nopr 11.0% 11.3% 13.9% 14.5%
vipo pref 7.4% 7.2% 13.5% 13.1%
Total number of individuals 179,360 180,420 195,137 196,025
Average number of visits
treated
GP o¢ce visits 1.89 1.77 2.16 2.12
GP home visits 1.21 1.03 1.59 1.47
Specialist visits 1.31 1.28 1.94 1.94
controls
GP o¢ce visits 2.35 2.25 1.93 2.02
GP home visits 5.68 5.47 8.32 8.34
Specialist visits 1.81 1.81 1.79 1.83
a To avoid too small a cell size, this categorical variable is not de…ned for
individuals belonging to the social category ’vipo’ and aged < 30.
b This categorical variable is de…ned only for individuals in the category ’tip’.
30TABLE 2 : Evolution of the co-payment rates
GP o¢ce visits GP home visits Specialist visits
euro rate index euro rate index euro rate index
(1994)a % (1994)a % (1994)a %
treated
1993 2.62 20 100.0 4.22 25 100.0 5.13 25 100.0
1994 3.87 30 147.9 5.68 35 134.7 8.18 40 159.5
controls
1993 0.99 8 100.0 1.29 8 100.0 1.75 9 100.0
1994 0.99 8 100.1 1.29 8 99.5 1.74 9 99.1
a The 1993 …gures are de‡ated by the CPI. The exchange rate is 40.3399 BEF/euro.
Source: Alliance Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes (1995), M-Informations, p.13.
31TABLE 3a : Di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DD) estimates
(standard errors in parentheses)
Mena
i bnmodel j 0 1 1¤ 1¤r
interactions c no no yes yes








w11 -.027 -.017/-.05 -.004/-.01 .001/.01







w21 -.230 -.047/-.19 -.038/-.14 -.022/-.08







w31 -.082 -.033/-.08 -.012/-.03 -.030/-.07
(.026) (.011/.03) (.013/.03) (.011/.02)
# of cells 204 204 132
WSSR 189.5 190.4 117.5 131.9 d
DF 198 198 120 128
P-value 0.655 0.638 0.546 0.389
a The estimated intercepts and the variance-covariance
matrix of the residuals are not reported.
b i=1 for GP o¢ce visits, i=2 for GP home visits, i=3 for
specialist visits.
c A di¤erent intercept for individuals with dependants and
for those aged between 30 and 50.
d Restrictions on 1* cannot be rejected (P-level=7.4%;
Â2(8)=14.3).
0 Logarithmic DD model (4).
1 Rotterdam DD model (8).
1* as 1, but on a restricted sample excluding groups with
earnings > 12,500 euro and including intercept interactions.
1*r Restrictions (20) and (21) imposed on 1*.
32TABLE 3b : Di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DD) estimates
(standard errors in parentheses)
Womena
i bnmodel j 0 1 1¤ 1¤r
interactions c no no yes yes








w11 -.139 -.032/-.12 -.017/-.07 -.013/-.06







w21 -.202 -.035/-.16 -.028/-.09 -.000/-.00







w31 -.012 -.013/-.02 .005/.01 .001/.00
(.031) (.010/.02) (.017/.02) (.007/.01)
# of cells 204 204 96
WSSR 176.1 162.6 89.2 103.8 d
DF 198 198 84 92
P-value 0.866 0.969 0.329 0.188
a The estimated intercepts and the variance-covariance
matrix of the residuals are not reported.
b i=1 for GP o¢ce visits, i=2 for GP home visits, i=3 for
specialist visits.
c Interaction of intercept for individuals with dependants
and for those living in Gent.
d Restrictions on 1* cannot be rejected (P-level=6.7%;
Â2(8)=14.6).
0 Logarithmic DD model (4).
1 Rotterdam DD model (8).
1* As 1, but on a restricted sample excluding groups with
earnings > 0 and including interactions for the intercept.
1¤r Restrictions (20) and (21) imposed on 1*.
33TABLE 4a: The Second Budgeting Stage of the Rotterdam model (17) (a2 = 0)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Men a






j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 0 .138/.47 -.275/-.95 .088/.30 .187/.64
(.039/.13) (.798/2.74) (.371/1.27) (.429/1.47)
i = 2 -.025/-.09 .382/1.38 .088/.32 -.028/-.10 -.060/-.22
(.008/.03) (.043/.15) (.371/1.34) (.146/0.53) (.227/.82)
i = 3 c .025/.06 .480/1.11 .187/.43 -.060/-.14 -.127/-.29
(.008/.02) (.043/.10) (.429/.99) (.227/.53) (.210/.48)
WSSR = 86.803 DF = 88 - 10 = 78 P-value = 0.232
a The variance-covariance matrix of the residuals is not reported.
b i=1 for GP o¢ce visits, i=2 for GP home visits, i=3 for specialist visits.
c Figures deduced from the estimation of the …rst two equations.
d Intercept for the reference individual. Interactions for individuals with dependants
and for those aged between 30 and 50 not reported.
e Elasticities are calculated on the basis of the average budget share of treatment
group (tip and vipo nopr).
34TABLE 4b : The Second Budgeting Stage of the Rotterdam model (17) (a3 = 0)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Women a






j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 .024/.10 .075/.32 -.523/-2.20 .330/1.39 .193/.81
(.015/.06) (.039/.16) (1.677/7.06) (.828/3.49) (.852/3.59)
i = 2 -.024/.08 c .668/2.24 .330/1.11 -.209/-.70 -.122/-.41
(.015/.05) (.050/.17) (.828/2.78) (.389/1.31) (.442/1.48)
i = 3 c 0 .256/.55 .193/.42 -.122/-.26 -.071/-.15
(.046/.10) (.852/1.83) (.442/.95) (.410/.88)
WSSR = 62.247 DF = 64 - 10 = 54 P-value = 0.206
a The variance-covariance matrix of the residuals is not reported.
b i=1 for GP o¢ce visits, i=2 for GP home visits, i=3 for specialist visits.
c Figures deduced from the estimation of the …rst two equations.
d Intercept for the reference individual. Interactions for individuals with dependants
and for those living in Gent not reported.
e Elasticities are calculated on the basis of the average budget share of treatment
group (tip and vipo nopr).
35Table 5: Decomposition of the average price e¤ects of the treated.
The Rotterdam model
total income e¤ect substitution e¤ects
¢lnqi1 ´ib0¢lnPG1 total =
P
²ij¢lnpj1
Men total j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 -0.005 -0.025 +0.020 -0.384 +0.095 +0.309
i = 2 -0.081 -0.074 -0.007 +0.133 -0.033 -0.107
i = 3 -0.070 -0.060 -0.010 +0.182 -0.045 -0.147
Women total j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 -0.068 -0.004 -0.064 -0.854 +0.418 +0.372
i = 2 0.007 -0.030 +0.037 +0.502 -0.246 -0.219
i = 3 0.006 -0.007 +0.013 +0.170 -0.083 -0.074
i=1 for GP o¢ce visits, i=2 for GP home visits, i=3 for specialist visits.
36Table 6: Decomposition of the total gross e¢ciency gain
total income e¤ects substitution e¤ects
Men total j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 4 17 -13 265 -66 -212
i = 2 45 41 4 -73 18 59
i = 3 51 45 6 -135 33 108
total 100 103 -3 57 -15 -45
Women total j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 134 7 127 1607 -786 -694
i = 2 -16 54 -70 -883 432 381
i = 3 -18 18 -36 -447 219 192
total 100 79 21 277 -135 -121
i=1 for GP o¢ce visits, i=2 for GP home visits, i=3 for specialist visits.
37